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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRE
SUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS AFFORDED STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
AND DEFERENCE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION

Stare decisis literally means "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided
cases." 1 There is no federal statute which requires stare decisis, 2 nor is
it a rule of law. Rather, stare decisis is a matter of public policy,3 the
importance of which is undisputed in Anglo-Americanjurisprudence.4
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990); see Pound, What 0/ Stare Deci
sis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 6 (1941) ("The decision of the ultimate court of review in a
common-law jurisdiction is held to bind all inferior courts of that jurisdiction ...."); Note,
Stare Decisis in Courts 0/ Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. REv. 409, 413 (1924).
2. The United States Code allows the Supreme Court to review lower court decisions
two ways:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party ...; [or]
(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law
... as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme
Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for
decision of the entire matter in controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). This implies that only the
Supreme Court may reverse lower court decisions or remand the case with instructions.
See generally Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law o/the Case, 21
TEX. L. REv. 514, 525 (1943) ("A decision of the United States Supreme Court is binding
on federal matters on all other courts, federal or state. "); Note, Stare Decisis and the Lower
Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 504,507 (1959).
3. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis
senting) ("Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more impor
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."), overruled in
part on other graunds, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 369-70 (1938) and
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938); Geohegan v. Union
Elevated R.R., 266 Ill. 482,496, 107 N.E. 786, 793 (1915).
4. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The essence
of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare decisis is that the rule of the case creates a
binding legal precept. The doctrine is so central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that it
scarcely need be mentioned, let alone discussed at length."); see Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (Several factors underlying stare decisis include re
spect for the judicial system, certainty in the application of laws, and fairness and expedi
tiousness in the administration of justice.); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389-402
(1943) (more important to follow precedent, even though it be unsatisfactory, in order to
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One narrow aspect of stare decisis focuses on statutory prece
dent. S Compared to common law precedents and constitutional prece
dents, 6 statutory precedents are given a strong presumption of
correctness. 7 This presumption may be rebutted, however, "by
avoid the unfortunate practical results of changing the rule); H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN &
A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD 5 (1980) (explaining the role of stare decisis in common law
systems); Comment, Judicial Precedents.-A Short Study in Comparative Jurisprudence., 9
MARV. L. REv. 27, 35-36 (1895) ("[I]t is law in England and in the United States that,
apart from its intrinsic merits, the decision of a court . . . is absolutely binding on all
inferior courts."). But see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1361 (1988) ("Stare deCisis ... has been considered by American courts to be more a rule of
thumb than an ironfisted command."); Moore & Oglebay, supra note 2, at 539 (An Ameri
can court does not feel itself "inexorably bound by its own precedents. ").
5. See generally Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1363.
6. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Since we deal with a constitutional
question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas
of the law."); see Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH.
L. REv. 151, 152-55 (1958) (Supreme Court overruled past precedent at least 90 times
between 1810 and 1957, 60 of which involved constitutional precedents); Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735, 743 (1949) (Supreme Court overruled constitutional
precedents 21 times between 1937 and 1949); Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases:
Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 123, 127 (1985) (Stare
decisis is not applied rigidly in constitutional cases because "constitutional law is thought
to be a living instrument of public policy adaptable to changing circumstances. "); Maltz,
Some Thoughts on the Death o/Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 467,
467 (Supreme Court overruled constitutional precedents at least 47 times between 1959 and
1979); see also Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling 0/ Constitutional Decisions in the
Warren Year.f, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 101, 112-26 (1969) (A survey of precedents overruled by
the Warren Court and accompanying rationales for their decisions).
7. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989) ("Considerations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of,statutory interpretation ...."); Square D
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,424 (1986) (The six decades that
have passed "are insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of continued validity that
adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute."); see, e.g., NLRB v. International Long
shoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985) ("(W]e should follow the normal presumption of
stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 736 (1977) ("[W]e must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily
in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpre
tation of its legislation. ").
Several writers have commented on the distinction between the presumption of cor
rectness afforded statutory precedent as compared to constitutional precedent. For exam
ple, one commentator noted:
The doctrine of finality for prior decisions setting the course for the interpre
tation of a statute is not always followed .... Nevertheless, the doctrine remains
as more than descriptive. More than any other doctrine in the field of precedent,
it has served to limit the freedom of the court. It marks an essential difference
between statutory interpretation on the one hand and case law and constitutional
interpretation on' the other.
Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. SOl, 540 (1948), quoted in
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 n.34 (1986); Mar
shall, "Let Congress Do It':' The Case For An Absolute Rule 0/ Statutory Stare Decisis, 88
MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989) (advocating an absolute rule that only Congress has the

1991]

STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

191

changed circumstances which render the statutory precedent not only
inconsistent with original legislative expectations and evolving statu
tory policy, but indeed counterproductive to current policy."8
When courts are faced with an issue of statutory interpretation,
they look to precedent for guidance; they also look to the agency
charged with administering the statute. An agency will often have
taken a position on a particular issue through the issuance of an inter
pretative rule. 9 When judicial precedent and an interpretative rule dif
power to overrule the Court's interpretation of federal statutes); see R. KEETON, VENTUR
ING TO Do JUSTICE 79 (1969) ("Can and should the court overrule its earlier [statutory]
interpretational decision, subject only to the same limitations it would apply in overruling
one of its common law decisions? Not so, say many courts and writers."); Eskridge, supra
note 4, at 1363 (suggesting the super-strong presumption should be abandoned and re
placed with an "evolutive" approach which the· Court has suggested in constitutional
cases); Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool 0/ Judiciol Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REv. 247
(1947) (supporting super-strong presumption given statutory precedents); Rogers, Judicial
Reinterpretation o/Statutes: The Example 0/ Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 611, 626 (1977) (Stare decisis should be adhered to more strictly in statutory cases
than in common law or constitutional cases.); see also Maltz, The Nature 0/ Precedent, 66
N.C.L. REv. 367, 388-89 (1988) (criticizing the Court's reasons in distinguishing between
statutory, common law, and constitutional precedents); Note, The Power That Shall Be
Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L.
REv. 345, 370-71 (1986) (supporting presumption of validity in statutory precedent, but
disagreeing with the presumption in constitutional cases). But see R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-55 (1975) (criticizing super-strong
presumption afforded statutory precedents).
8. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1364. The precedent should not be overruled unless the
original reasons for the rule have disappeared or have been weakened, the rule has been
persuasively criticized, and practical experience shows the original goals are being under
mined by the existing rule. Id. The precedent should not be overruled, however, if there
has been "substantial legislation or private reliance on the rule." Id.; see Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-79 (1987) (Court overruled Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), but refused to overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), Ex parte New York, No. I, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), and cases relying on them. Hans
and the line of cases that followed will not be overruled in the absence of "special justifica
tion" for such a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis.); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219, 224-30 (1987) (The Court ovei-ruIed Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66 (1861). Due to the passage of time, the fundamental holding of Dennison was not
representative of the current law because it was decided during the Civil War when state
secession was threatening and the federal government's power was at its lowest point.).
9. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The ppwer of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the forma
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con
gress."); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:11, at 55 (2d ed. 1979)
("When Congress enacts a statute and assigns the administration of it to an agency, the
agency encounters questions the statute does not answer and the agency must answer them.
The agency heads must instruct their staffs what to do about such questions ....."); Bon
field, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making 0/ Interpretative Rules
and General Statements 0/ Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101,118 (1971)
("An active agency with a broad mandate ... may formally or informally take positions on
literally hundreds of questions with regard to the proper construction of the statutes or
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fer, courts are iIi a peculiar situation that calls for a delicate balancing
of policies.
Although courts may be bound, to an extent, by precedent, and
almost absolutely bound by a legislative rule,lO an interpretative rule is
not binding on the courts. I I Even though not binding, courts may give
an interpretative rule authoritative effect. 12
Courts sometimes give authoritative effect to an interpretative
rule when they agree with the agency}3 Similarly, courts will defer to
the agency when the courts lack sufficient expertise and are satisfied
with the agency's rule. 14 Likewise, courts may defer to the agency
regulations it administers each month."); Saunders, Agency Interpretations and Judicial
Review: A Search for Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given Agency Statutory Con
structions, 30 Alllz. L. REv. 769, 770 (1988) (''The rules an agency issues in its efforts to
inform its staff and the public in the course of its statutory construction are known as
interpretative rules.").
10. Legislative rules have been described as "the product of an exercise of delegated
legislative power to make law through rules." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:8, at 36.
Legislative rules are set aside only if "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity; [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1988).
11. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We consider that the rul
ings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not control
ling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."); 2 K.
DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59.
The Administrative Procedure Act suggested that interpretative rules were to have
little effect on a court's statutory construction. It originally stated, "[s]o far as necessary to
decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicabil
ity of the terms of any agency action." Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 100e), 60
Stat. 237, 243 (1946). The law currently states: "To the extent necessary to decision and
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary further explained that the "subsection pro
vides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analy
sis." S. REp. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 185,214 (1946). The report of the House Com
mittee on the Judiciary gives the same explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HIS
TORY 233, 278 (1946). The Senate Committee also explained that" 'interpretative' rules
as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review,
whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion." SENATE
CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CoNG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1946), reprinted in AD
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11, 18 (1946) (emphasis added).
12. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970) ("While ... HEW's con
struction commands less than the usual deference that may be accorded an administrative

1991]

STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

193

depending upon the date of the creation of the interpretative rule. If
the rule has been longstanding, courts may be less reluctant to adopt
it. IS
If the courts do not give the agency interpretation authoritative
effect, the courts may give the interpretation varying degrees of defer
ence, ranging from "the greatest deference"16 to virtually no defer
enceP Reviewing courts are also free to substitute their own
judgment for the content of the interpretative rule. IS
Because there is no administrative rule of stare decisis,19 an
agency is free to change its interpretative rule even after the Supreme
Court has ruled on a particular interpretation of the rule. When the
two rules differ, lower courts must then determine whether to follow
interpretation based on its expertise, it is entitled to weight as the attempt of an experienced
agency to harmonize an obscure enactment with the basic structure of a program it ad
ministers."); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("A
high degree [of deference] is appropriate ... when the agency's expertise can help in assess
ing the effects of competing interpretations upon the policies of the statute ...."); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[D]eference is not a uni
tary concept, to be applied with equal force to all issues in a case. If some issues involve
scientific expertise and others do not, the agency will receive greater deference on the issues
that do. ").
15. See infra note 188.
16. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
46, 56, 57-58 (1981) ("[U]nless the ... Act requires a contrary conclusion, the Board's
interpretation of the plain language of the ... Act must be upheld."); EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) ("It is by now a commonplace [sic] that 'when
faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.' "
(quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965»); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (great deference is the "general rule").
17. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 60.
18. 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 29:1, at 332.
19. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) ("An administrative
agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts still sit in
review of the administrative decision and should not approach the statutory construction
issue de novo and without regard to the administrative understanding of the statutes. ");
Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 149 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
("There is, of course, no rule of administrative stare decisis. Agencies frequently adopt one
interpretation of a statute and then, years later, adopt a different view." Courts have ap
proved such interpretative changes so long as the new interpretation is consistent with
congressional intent.). One commentator noted:
[T]he adjudicative officials of administrative agencies share and respond to the
feelings and aspirations that are reflected in the principle of stare decisis: the urge
for intellectual consistency in decision-making and the wish to demonstrate that
equality of treatment is being given to all claimants and respondents.... But it
would be grossly misleading to suggest that the common law doctrine of prece
dent is, as in the courts, the pervasive and governing norm of administrative
adjudication.
H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN, & A. MURPHY, supra note 4, at ll-l2.
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the older rule endorsed by the Supreme Court or defer to the agency
and its new interpretative rule. 20 In making their determinations, the
lower courts must keep in mind the doctrine of stare decisis and the
strong presumption of correctness given judicial interpretations of
statutory language.
Recently, in Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California
District Council ofLaborers,21 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir
cuit confronted such a situation. The Ninth Circuit was faced with an
interpretative rule adopted by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") which stated that prehire agreements22 could not be unilat
erally repudiated. 23 By contrast, two earlier Supreme Court decisions
held that these agreements could be unilaterally repudiated. 24 In the
earlier Supreme Court cases, the Court and the NLRB agreed on the
particular statutory interpretation. 2s Later, the NLRB announced it
had changed its position on the statutory interpretation; its new inter
pretative rule now contradicted the rule previously upheld by the
Supreme Court. 26
When confronted with these two contrasting rules, the Ninth Cir
cuit opted to defer to the agency, thus implementing the agency's new
interpretative rule. 27 The result was a rule of law in stark contrast to
the one previously adopted by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit
rationalized its decision by construing the earlier Supreme Court
precedents as simple deference to the NLRB.28 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the strong presumption of correctness given such judi
cial interpretations.
This Note explores the environment which gave rise to Mesa
Verde. Section I discusses statutory stare decisis and provides a brief
background of the NLRB and'its relationship with the courts. Section
20. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 428-29 (1983) ("The application of
Supreme Court decisions to executive branch policies is virtually undisputed: if a particu
lar policy is found unconstitutional, or contrary to the statute, that decision is binding on
the agency. The appropriate application of circuit and district court decisions to agency
policies is not as clear-cut. ").
21. 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
22. See infra note 73.
23. See infra notes 80-81.
24. Jim McNeff, Inc. V. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983); NLRB V. Local Union No. 103,
434 U.S. 335 (1978) (commonly referred to as "Higdon"); see infra notes 80-81.
25. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 266-71; Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351-52.
26. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 V.
NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 771 (3d Cir.), cerro denied, 488 U.S. 889-90 (1988).
27. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. V. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124,1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990).
28. Id. at 1129-31.
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II sets out the facts of Mesa Verde and the court's reasoning. Section
III suggests that the Supreme Court's interpretation became a part of
the statute, due to statutory stare decisis, and as such it enjoyed a
strong presumption of correctness. Section III then presents the tradi
tional exceptions to statutory stare decisis to determine whether Mesa
Verde is a justifiable departure. Finally, Section III rationalizes the
decision under deference to agencies to determine whether the court's
deference was appropriate.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Stare Decisis 29

The origins of the "doctrine" of statutory stare decisis are some
thing of a mystery.30 Several different rationales have been advanced
for the strong presumption granted statutory precedents. The
Supreme Court once said that a longstanding statutory interpretation
becomes "part of the warp and woof of the legislation,"3l which only
Congress can change. 32 The statute then becomes amended to the ex
29. For early examples of unusual stare decisis protection granted statutory
precedents, see Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1366 n.24.
30. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1364 ("[T]he super-strong presumption against over
ruling statutory precedents is a very odd doctrine, if it can even be called that."). Not until
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. did the Court recognize a relaxed standard of stare
decisis for constitutional cases. See 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part on other grounds, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938) and
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Louis Brandeis stated that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet, 285 U.S. at 4.Q6.07 (citation and
footnote omitted). Although there was no distinction mentioned between common law and
statutory precedents, Justice Brandeis elaborated on this point in a later opinion. In the
later opinion, Justice Brandeis was fully persuaded of the precedent's error, but stated:
"[i]f only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitution
ality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so." Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (footnote omitted) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842».
31. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450(1948); cf Douglass v. County of
Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879) ("After a statute has been settled by judicial construction,
the construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as
much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and
purposes the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a
legislative enactment. ").
32. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986) ("We are especially reluctant to reject this presumption in an area that has seen
careful, intense, and sustained congressional attention. If there is to be an overruling ... ,
it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court."); Francis, 333 U.S. at 450.
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tent of the court's decision. 33
Another reason for supporting the strong presumption of statu
tory precedent is founded upon legislative acquiescence. 34 Congress is
presumed to be fully cognizant of the interpretation of the statutory
scheme. 35 If Congress does not overrule the precedent, and especially
if it reenacts the statute without changing the language at issue, courts
presume Congress approved of the judicial interpretation. 36 Any sub
sequent change of this judicial decision should then come from the
legislature. 37
33. Horack, supra note 7, at 250.
34. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7
(1987); see NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985) (Con
gress had not altered the interpretation since it was handed down eighteen years before
hand, nor was any evidence offered regarding Congress' original intent. Meanwhile, both
labor and management had relied on the decision. "In such circumstances we should fol
low the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation."); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1977); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inac
tion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 91 (1988).
35. Square DCa., 476 U.S. at 419; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
837 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97
(1979) ("It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citi
zens, know the law ...."); see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). But see
Marshall, supra note 7, at 182-96 (criticizing theory of congressional acquiescence); Rogers,
supra note 7, at 612 (Because legislatures are extremely busy, "[t]he issue presented by a
court reversal of a prior statutory construction may be considered trivial or of little impor
tance compared to the other questions confronting a legislature.").
36. Square DCa., 476 U.S. at 419 (Congress specifically addressed this area and left
the case at issue undisturbed; this lends "powerful support" to the case's continued viabil
ity.); Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (reenactment is treated as ratifica
tion of court's earlier decision); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940)
("The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed,
and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial con
struction as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is
the correct one."); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70-76 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dis
senting) (failure of Congress to overrule statutory interpretation creates presumption of
legislative approval); see Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356,357 (1953) (per
curiam) (legislative acquiescence in precedent); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 130-32
(1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (legislative approval presumed when Congress reenacted
statute with Court's interpretation unchanged). But see Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119 ("It
would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this
Court from reexamining its own doctrines."); Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69 ("It is at best
treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of
law."); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring)
("Notwithstanding recent tendency, the idea cannot always be accepted that Congress, by
remaining silent and taking no affirmative action in repudiation, gives approval to judicial
misconstruction of its enactments. ").
37. Horack, supra note 7, at 251-52 (The court's reversal of a previous position of an
established rule of law "is explicitly and unquestionably the exercise of a legislative func
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A third reason advanced for the strong presumption of correct
ness is founded upon the belief that parties have relied upon the deci
sion. Once the Supreme Court interprets a statute, private parties will
conduct their affairs accordingly.38 Presumably, Congress also relies
upon the interpretation unless it changes the statute. 39
The final reason suggested for the presumption hinges upon the
separation of powers between Congress and the courts. 40 Under the
Constitution, Congress has the task of creating law, while the judiciary
is confined to interpreting the law. When the jUdiciary overrul~ a
statutory precedent which has been "amended" to the statute, it is
exercising the congressional power of amending or repealing the law
without any of the procedural safeguards associated with the legisla
ture. This judicial exercise of a legislative function is impermissible
under the separation of powers doctrine.
Although courts and commentators offer different reasons for the
doctrine of the presumption of correctness afforded statutory prece
dents, there can be no doubt as to its' existence. Thus, when a court
encounters an issue of statutory interpretation, it should carefully ex
amine the judicial precedent in light of the strong presumption of
correctness.
In addition, courts naturally look for guidance to the agency
charged with administering the statute. In Mesa Verde, the relevant
agency was the NLRB. Before considering the case itself, however,
perspective can be gained by examining the NLRB's long, and some
times stormy, relationship with the court system.
B.

Board and Court Relationship

Congress adopted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"
or the "Act"),41 administered by the National Labor Relations
Board,42 against a backdrop ofjudicial insensitivity to the principles of
tion, ... The judicial change of a legislative rule occurs without any of the safeguards
nonnally surrounding legislative action. The change is not made by elected representa
tives." It is not done with the usual committee meetings which allow individuals to voice
their opinions, nor is there an opportunity for executive veto.).
38. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382-84.
39. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time fail
ure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by
Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is
persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one.").
40. Marshall, supra note 7, at 200-08.
41. National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198,
49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988».
42. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 6(a), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988».
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unionism and collective bargaining. 43 Because of this, the Act makes
limited provision for judicial review. 44
Soon' after the enactment of the statute, the Supreme Court ar
ticulated the Act's purposes and its scope in National Labor Relations
Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 45 The Court stated that the Act was
designed to prevent obstructions to the free flow of commerce which
result from strikes and other forms of industrial unrest. 46 This was to
be achieved by eliminating the causes of that unrest.47 The Act was
premised on findings that strikes and industrial strife result from the
refusal of employers to bargain collectively and the inability of individ
ual workers to bargain successfully for improvements in their working
conditions. 48
The Court, in Hearst Publications, stated that the Act uses broad
language which "leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be deter
mined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts
rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal
classifications."49 The Court then explained that the lower courts
should defer to the NLRB, in appropriate situations, for the peaceful
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) af
fecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjust
ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise ....
29 U.S.C. § 16O(a) (1988).
43. Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 399,401 (1988); see Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A
Decade of Frustration, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 327, 328 (1958); Reilly, The Legisla
tive History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 288 (1960).
44. Originally, the Act stated: "[t]he findings of the Board as to the facts, if sup
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive." National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-198, § 100e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft
Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 148 (1947). Currently, the law
states: "[t]he findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by sub
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C.
§ 16O(e) (1988); see Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretation ofLabor Laws, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 577,
595 (1939).
45. 322 U.S. III (1944).
46. Id. at 126.
47. Id.
48. Id. In 1947, Congress reduced the Act's coverage with the passage of the Taft
Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) ~ct, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988». The preamble of this amend
ment still refers to "industrial strife" as the principle evil to be avoided by the Act. Id.
§ 1(b), 61 Stat. 136, 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988». Even after the Amend
ment was passed, the limited judicial review remained. Id. § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 148 (codi
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 16O(e) (1988».
49. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 129.
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settlement of employees' disputes with employers. The NLRB de
serves this deference because of its familiarity with the circumstances
and backgrounds of employment relationships, awareness of the abili
ties and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective ac
tion, and its knowledge of collective bargaining. 50 In particular, the
Court explained exactly when it was appropriate to defer to the Board:
Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is not the
court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the
Board's, when the latter have support in the record. Undoubtedly
questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the
first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve,
giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special
duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the question
is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceed
ing in which the agency administering the statute must determine it
initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.... [T)he Board's
determination ... is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record"
and a reasonable basis in law. 51

In spite of this recommended deference, courts, especially the
courts of appeals,52 have been quick to overrule the Board's deci
sions. 53 The courts of appeals' rejections of Board decisions have been
50. Id. at 129-30.
51. Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted). For similar language, see, e.g., Bayside Enters.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1977); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251,
260-67 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235-37 (1963); NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1172-73
(2d Cir. 1968).
52. For additional discussion of the relationship between agencies and the courts, see
generally Dotson & Williamson, NLRB v. The Courts: The Need for an Acquiescence Policy
at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 739 (1987); Kaiker, Nonacquiescence by the
NLRB: Combat Versus Collabaration, 3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987); Saunders, Agency Interpre
tations and Judicial Review: A Search for Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given
Agency Statutory Constructions, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 769 (1988); Zimmerman & Dunn, Rela
tions Between the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A Tale of Acrimony and Accommo
dation, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4 (1982); Comment, "Respectful Disagreement":
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals
Precedents, 18 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463 (1985).
53. One commentator compared the results of two studies on the relationship be
tween the Supreme Court and the NLRB. The studies were conducted twenty years apart
and compared in the latter article. In both studies, he concluded: "(I) that the Supreme
Court basically approves of the Board's concept of the meaning of the labor statute and (2)
that a major portion of the Supreme Court's role in labor policy has been to protect the
Board from the circuit courts." Evans, "Caesar" Revisited: The NLRB and the Supreme
Court, 36 LAB. L.J. 789, 789 (1985). Contra Winter, Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions:
The Labar Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. Cr. REV. 53,72 ("The Supreme Court has in
fact shown little deference to Board discretion . . . . And more frequently than not, the
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so constant that the Board adopted the following policy of nonacquies
cence: S4 "It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to deter
mine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a circuit court of
appeals or whether, with due deference to the court's opinion, to ad
here to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled otherwise.""
The result of the Board's policy of nonacquiescence is a bifur
cated system in which litigants can avoid the Board's orders by simply
litigating to the appellate level. 56 The effect of the Board's policy is to
protract litigation, establish a two-tier system of labor law within the
same jurisdiction, encourage disrespect for Board orders, and antago
nize the courts. S7 This two-tier system places an undue burden on
those litigants who lack the necessary resources to pursue matters to
the court of appeals leveI.S8
Some courts expressly reject the Board's policy of nonacquies
cence: "Congress has not given to the NLRB the power or authority
Court has employed a broad scope of review that has permitted it to substitute its own
judgment. ").
54. There are two types of nonacquiescence: intracircuit and intercircuit. Intracir
cuit nonacquiescence results when an agency fails to defer to precedent within a given
circuit. Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 CoLUM. L. REv.
582, 583 (1985). "Intercircuit nonacquiescence is consistent with the prevailing 'law of the
circuit' doctrine, under which decisions of a court of appeals are the law of that circuit but
do not bind courts in other circuits." Kafker, supra note 52, at 138 (quoting Note, Admin
istrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 582, 583 (1985».
When discussing agency nonacquiescence, one commentator noted:
[T]he agencies enforce the statutory interpretations of the lower federal courts
only with respect to the particular litigants before the courts. . . . Even when
presented with the same questions of law, agencies continue to make determina
tions based upon their own prior administrative policies and statutory interpreta
tions, which the courts have previously rejected.
Note, Denying the Precedential Effect ofFederal Circuit Court Decisions: Nonacquiescence
by Administrative Agencies, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 151, 152 (1985) (footnote omitted».
The Board premises nonacquiescence on the fact that each court of appeals develops
its own "law of the circuit"; decisions of other courts of appeals are persuasive but not
binding authority. See City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d lOW, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) ("Decisions of district courts and other courts of appeals are, of course, not
binding on us and are looked to only for their persuasive effect. If they fail to persuade by
the use of sound and logical reasoning, they will not be followed, no matter how great their
number.").
55. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforcement de
nied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); see Inter-Island Resorts,
Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 n.12 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963),
enforced in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964).
56. Dotson & Williamson, supra note 52, at 745.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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to disagree, respectfully or otherwise, with decisions of th[e] COurt."S9
However, another court stated, "[w]e assume without deciding that
the [agency] is free to decline to follow decisions of the courts of ap
peals with which it disagrees, even in cases arising in those circuits."60
The judicial system tolerates the Board's policy of nonacquies
cence. Therefore, uniformity of law r~ults only when the Supreme
Court rules on the issue. 61 If, however, the Supreme Court rules to
support the Board's interpretation, and· the Board subsequently
changes its interpretation, the lower courts are faced with a conflict.
They must then decide whether to follow the decision of the Supreme
Court under the doctrine of stare decisis, or whether to defer to the
Board as the Supreme Court did.
Precisely this dilemma arose in the Ninth Circuit in the Mesa
Verde case. 62 The Ninth Circuit was faced with two earlier Supreme
Court rulings which upheld a particular NLRB interpretative rule.
The problem, however, was that both Supreme Court decisions argua
bly could be interpreted either as the Supreme Court articulating its
own rule (which happened to be in agreement with that of the NLRB)
or as the Supreme Court deferring completely to the NLRB. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit ha4 to determine whether, as a lower court, it could
disagree with the Supreme Court in light of the doctrine of statutory
stare decisis.

59. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he Board
is not a court nor is it equal to this court in matters of statutory interpretation. Thus, a
disagreement by the NLRB with a decision of this court is simply an academic exercise that
possesses no authoritative effect."); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("[Tlhe courts are the final authorities on
issues of statutory construction, and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their
affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate
or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.' " (quoting NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (citation omitted»).
60. S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1278 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d
224, 229-30 (2d Cir.) (reversing NLRB order and declining to remand case to Board, in
part because of Board's express refusal to follow Second Circuit precedent), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 975 (1980).
61. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforcement de
nied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1959), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Bethlehem Steel Co., 89
N.L.R.B. 1476, 1477 (1950) ("With due respect for the opinion of the [c]ourt ... , the
Board is constrained to adhere to the Board's original view until the Supreme Court of the
United States has had an opportunity to pass on the question.").
62. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
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MESA VERDE CONSTRUCTION CO. V. NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF LABORERS 63

In 1980, Mesa Verde, a general contractor, entered into agree
ments with both the laborers' union and the carpenters' union. These
agreements were entered into despite the fact that neither union had
obtained majority status. The first agreement with the Laborers was
reached on June 26, 1980, and was to remain in effect until June 15,
1983. 64 Thereafter, the agreement would remain in effect from year to
year, absent written notice by either party. Under the contract, Mesa
Verde agreed to comply with all wages, hours, and working conditions
which were set forth in the Laborers' Master Agreement for Northern
California. 6s The master agreement between the Laborers, the Associ
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. and Bay Counties Gen
eral Contractors Association, set wage rates for various jobs and
provided for arbitration in certain situations regarding "any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement."66 On
November 17, 1982, Mesa Verde and the Laborers agreed to extend
their contract to June 15, 1986.
Mesa Verde and the Carpenters reached their first agreement in
August, 1979. 67 Mesa Verde accepted the Carpenters' Master Agree
ment for Northern California, an agreement between the Carpenters,
the Building Industry Association of Northern California, the Califor
nia Contractors Council, Inc. and the Millwright Employers Associa
tion. The agreement set various rates and provided for arbitration of
"[a]ny dispute concerning the relationship of the parties, [and] any
application or interpretation of this [a]greement."68 Later, Mesa
Verde and the Carpenters extended the master agreement to June 15,
1986, with certain modifications. 69
In May, 1984, with members of both unions working on a project
in Hercules, California, Mesa Verde notified both unions by mail of its
intent to abrogate the agreements. 70 Shortly thereafter, Mesa Verde
began another job in Orland, California, employing only non-union
63.

Id.
Id. at 1126.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting the parties' contract).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting the parties' contract).
69. Id. These modifications included limited wage increases and provided more flexi
ble working conditions for Mesa Verde. Id.
70. Id.
64.

1991]

STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

203

workers. 71 This would constitute a violation of the collective bargain
ing agreements, should they still be in effect. Both unions filed notices
of grievance and requested arbitration concerning the contractual obli
gations for the Orland project.
Eventually, the district court granted Mesa Verde summary judg
ment against both unions.72 The court held that these collective bar
gaining agreements were construction industry prehire agreements 73
under 29 U.S.C. § 15874 (better known as section 8(f) of the
NLRA).7S These prehire agreements were effectively repudiated by
the letters sent by Mesa Verde to each of the unions.76
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1127; see Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Labor
ers, 598 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 1984),off'd, 895 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1989).
73. A prehire agreement is the first step taken between an employer and a union. It
contemplates that further action will be taken to develop a full bargaining relationship.
The employer's obligation to fulfill the agreement is contingent upon the union attaining
. majority status. Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971). Congress author
ized these agreements between the employer and the union even though the union did not
maintain a majority status. This authorization was given based on the "uniquely tempo
rary, transitory, and sometimes seasonal nature of much of the employment in the con
struction industry." Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266 (1983).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction indus
try to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their em
ployment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor
organization of which building and construction employees are members (not es
tablished, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this
section as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor
organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this
title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a
condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the sev
enth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of the
agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to
notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such em
ployer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified appli
cants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or
experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities
for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry
or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection
shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Provided fur
ther, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) ofthis subsec
tion, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of
this title.
Id.
75. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990).
76. Id. The district court also denied the Laborers' motion to vacate and did not
grant the Laborers additional discovery to detemtine the existence of a core group of em
ployees. Id.
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Initially, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, in accordance with Supreme
Court precedent. 77 On rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a peculiar situation. First, the Ninth Circuit noted that in a re
cent case in the Third Circuit, International Association of Bridge.
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers. Local 3 v. NLRB
("Deklewa"),78 the Board had changed its interpretative rule. 79 This
new administrative rule was now contrary to the one upheld in two
Supreme Court precedents: NLRB v. Local Union No. 103 ("Hig
don")80 and Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd. 8l Both precedents were in ac
cord with the Board's older rule that prehire agreements could be
77. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 832 F.2d
1164 (9th Cir. 1981). The two Supreme Court precedents are Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,
461 U.S. 260, 271 (1983) ("A § 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the
union establishes majority status.") and NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 341
(1978) ("Higdon") (A prehire agreement is voidable unless and until the union actually
represents a majority of the employees.). See infra notes 80-81.
78. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) [hereinafter Deklewa, so
named for the company John Deklewa & Sons involved in the suit]. Deklewa was decided
after the Ninth Circuit's panel decision and before the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision.
79. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1128.
80. 434 U.S. 335 (1978) ("Higdon," so called for the Higdon Construction Co. in
volved in the suit). Higdon Construction Co. and Local 103 of the International Associa
tion of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (Local 103) entered into
a prehire agreement which obliged Higdon to abide by the terms of the multiemployer
understanding between Local 103 and the Tri-State Iron Workers Employers Association,
Inc. Id. at 339. At the same time, Higdon Contracting Co. was formed expressly to carry
on work with nonunion labor. Local 103 never represented a majority of the employees,
nor did it petition for a representation election to determine the preference of the employ
ees. Id. Regardless, Local 103 picketed two projects undertaken by Higdon Contracting
Co. Local 103 carried signs which read: "Higdon Construction Company is in violation of
the agreement of the Iron Workers Local Number 103." Id. Because of the picketing,
Higdon filed a charge with the Regional Director of the Board, which alleged that Local
103's picketing constituted an unfair labor practice which was forbidden by section 8(b)(7)
of the NLRA. Id.
Initially, the administrative law judge determined that Higdon Contracting Co. and
Higdon Construction Co. were legally indistinct for purposes of the proceeding. Id. The
judge also decided that there was no unfair labor practice because Higdon had entered into
a lawful section 8(f) prehire contract with Local 103 in which it promised to abide by the
multiemployer standard. Id. The purpose of the picketing was to obtain compliance with
an existing contract, not for the forbidden purpose of obtaining recognition as the bargain
ing representative. Id.
On appeal, the issue in Higdon was whether unions could picket to enforce prehire
agreements, even though the union had not obtained majority status. Id. at 341. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Board and declared that under section 8(f) of the NLRA a
prehire agreement was voidable. unless and until a union attains majority status. Id.
After determining that the agreement was voidable, the Supreme Court held that there
could be no picketing. Id. at 341-52. The Court reasoned that under section 8(f), a prehire
agreement does not entitle a minority union to be treated as the majority representative of
the employees until and unless it attains majority support in the relevant unit. Id. at 346
52. Until then, the prehire agreement is voidable and does not have the same stature as a
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repudiated unilaterally. The Board's new interpretative rule declared
collective bargaining contract entered into with a union which actually represents a major
ity of the employees and recognized as such by the employer. Id.
The Court also noted that picketing by a minority union to enforce a prehire agree
ment that the employer refuses to honor gives the union the practical effect of attaining
recognition as the bargaining representative with majority support among the employees.
Id. Acting as the bargaining representative without having majority support is a violation
of section 8(bX7)(C) of the NLRA. Id. at 341. This is consistent with the statutory policy
that a union should not purport to act as the collective-bargaining agent for all unit em
ployees, nor should it be recognized as the bargaining agent, unless it is indeed the voice of
the majority of the employees in the unit. Id.
29 U.S.C. § IS8(bX7)(C), which describes labor practices regarding picketing,
provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(7) to picket ... any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring
an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa
tive of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to
accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representa
tive, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of
such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section IS9(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period oftime not
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided,
That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without
regard to the provisions of section IS9(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a
showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct
an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify
the results thereof ....
29 U.S.C. § IS8(bX7XC) (1988).
81. 461 U.S. 260 (1983). The Supreme Court again expanded the obligations arising
under prehire agreements in McNeff. In McNeff, the petitioner was a subcontractor. [d. at
262. The general contractor entered into a master agreement with the union. Id. This
contract provided that work on the jobsite would be performed only by subcontractors who
had signed a labor agreement with the union. [d. When the petitioner began work at the
jobsite, he had not signed the labor agreement with the union, nor did he employ any union
workers. [d. at 263.
When the petitioner was informed that in order to remain on the jobsite he would have
to sign the master agreement, he initially refused but later agreed to sign it. Id. The master
agreement required the petitioner to make monthly contributions to a trust fund. Id. For
six months, the petitioner submitted the required reports but made no contributions. Id. at
263-64. After the petitioner delayed the respondents' audits as long as he could, the re
spondents finally determined that petitioner owed in excess of five thousand dollars to the
trust fund. Id. at 264.
The issue in McNeff was whether monetary obligations that accrued under a prehire
agreement could be enforced, prior to the repudiation of the agreement, when there was no
proof that the union represented a majority of the employees. [d. at 262.
The Supreme Court held that a prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the
union establishes majority status. [d. at 271. Even though majority status was not at
tained, the monetary obligations assumed by an employer under a prehire contract could be
recovered by a union prior to the repudiation of the contract. [d. at 271-72.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that Congress determined that prehire con
tracts should be lawful in order to meet the problems which are unique to the construction
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that prehire agreements were not voidable simply because the union
had not obtained majority status. The question now before the Ninth
Circuit was whether it could choose to implement the new agency rule
despite Supreme Court precedent.
At first glance, it appeared as though the Ninth Circuit could not
adopt the Board's new rule because it would be contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. 82 After analyzing both Higdon and McNeff, how
ever, the Ninth Circuit declared that "[i]n neither case . . . did the
Supreme Court definitively construe [section] 8(f). Rather, the Court
found that the Board's interpretation of [section] 8(f) was an accepta
ble interpretation of the statute and that it reasonably implemented
the purposes of the Act. The Court, therefore, deferred to the
NLRB's interpretation of [section] 8(f)."83
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to point out specific language
in both Higdon and McNeff to support its holding that the Supreme
Court only deferred to the NLRB.84 The Ninth Circuit first pointed
to the part of the Higdon opinion which stated that "the function of
striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a diffi
cult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed pri
marily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited
judicial review."8s The court noted that the Higdon Court "concluded
that the Board's construction of the Act, although perhaps not the
only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language
and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statu
tory sections."86 The Mesa Verde court then decided that the Higdon
Court did not "independently construe the reach and scope of section
8(f). Rather, the [Higdon] Court recognized the expertise and experi
ence of the Board in effectuating national labor policy as mandated by
Congress and limited its review to whether the Board's interpretation
of [section] 8(f) was reasonable."81
industry. Id. at 271. Even though a prehire agreement has a limited binding effect, logic
and equity support that a party to such an agreement can reap benefits only by paying the
bargained-for consideration. Id. Legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend
for employers to obtain the benefits of stable labor costs and labor peace without providing
some consideration. See id.
82. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209 (1990); see supra notes 80
81.
83. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1129.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957»).
86. Id. at 1129 (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341).
87. Id. at 1129.
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The Mesa Verde court then shifted its analysis to McNeff. The
Ninth Circuit held, just as in Higdon, that the McNeff Court did not
provide an independent construction of section 8(f).88 Rather, the
McNeff Court relied on the Higdon Court's affirmance of the Board's
interpretation of section 8(f).89 The Ninth Circuit pointed to specific
language in the McNeff opinion where that Court noted that in Hig
don it was approving the Board's interpretative rule. 90 The Mesa
Verde court then pointed to language in both Higdon and McNeff
which expressly recognized that an administrative agency is allowed to
change its interpretative rules. 91 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that
neither Higdon nor McNeff precluded it from adopting the Board's
new interpretative rule as expressed in Deklewa. 92 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that in both Higdon and McNeff, "the Supreme Court
looked to the Board's interpretation, found it reasonable and consis
tent with the NLRA, and deferred to the Board's interpretation."93
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided that it also could defer to the
Board, if the agency's interpretation met the standard established by
the Supreme Court. The next issue, then, was whether the new inter
pretation offered by the Board was a reasonable and tenable construc
tion of section 8(f).94 To determine the answer, the Mesa Verde court
first examined the legislative history. The court noted that when Con
gress passed section 8(f), it recognized the unique relationship among
the parties in the construction industry and the widespread use of
these prehire agreements. 9S
Congress recognized the special needs of the building and con
struction industry that arise due to the "occasional nature" of the em
ployment.96 This makes the construction industry different from other
industries, such as manufacturing. 97 A construction worker will typi
Id.
Id. (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1983».
90. Id. at 1129-31 (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 269).
91. Id. at 1130 (citing Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978».
92. Id. at 1130. See generally International Association ofBridge, Structural & Orna
mental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889
(1988) ("Deklewa"); supra note 78 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1130-31.
95. Id. at 1131. For legislative history, see generally S. REp. No. 187, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27-29, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2318,2344-45, and
in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLO
SURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 423-25 (1959).
96. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1131.
97. Id.
88.

89.
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cally work for several employers. 98 Frequently, jobs are of short dura
tion, depending upon the particular stage of the construction. 99 An
employer must know his labor cost before submitting his bid. An em
ployer must also have an available supply of skilled craftsmen for
quick referral. loo Enactment of section 8(f) recognized the industry
wide use of these prehire agreements which are designed to meet these
needs. 101
The Mesa Verde court reasoned that allowing unilateral repudia
tion of these collective bargaining agreements did not advance the con
gressional intent. 1m To allow parties to make prehire agreements, but
to allow them to be unilaterally repudiated would be an "exercise in
futility."t03 The Ninth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the legisla
tive intent more strongly supported the Deklewa nonrepudiation
rule. 104
The Mesa Verde court then examined the two most important
interests at issue controlling whether prehire agreements should be
voidable at will.IOS First, the NLRA 106 provides employees with free
dom of choice and majority rule in their selection of representatives. 107
Second, the structure of the collective bargaining process and various
provisions of the Act, like the "contract bar,"108 guarantee labor rela
tions stability to both employers and employees. 109 The Mesa Verde
court held that the old voidability rule provided more support for em
ployee free choice because limited section 9(a)110 status was not given
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Local Union No. ISO v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. Cit.
1973».
104. Id. at 1131.
105. Id.
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1988) (National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 9).
107. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1131-32.
108. "The 'contract bar' provides that once a certification election is held within an
appropriate bargaining unit, no other election may be held for twelve months." Id. at 1132
n.6. The contract bar does not apply to section 8(f) agreements. Id. at 1132.
109. Id. at 1131-32.
110. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
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to a union that had not demonstrated majority support. I II On the
other hand, the Board's new rule announced in Deklewa better served
the interest in labor relations stability. 112
Appellee and amici argued that by retaining the power to unilat
erally repudiate prehire agreements, employers were able to protect
their employees' "free choice" rights. l13 The Mesa Verde court was
not convinced. It stated that the employer's decision to repudiate a
prehire agreement is more likely to be based on the employer's eco
nomic considerations, rather than the employee's choice of maintain
ing the status quO. 114 The Mesa Verde court concluded liS that
Deklewa should be adopted in the Ninth Circuit, and it remanded to
the district court for a determination of whether Deklewa should be
applied retroactively. I 16
Three separate dissenting opinions were written in the Mesa
Verde cases. Judge Wallace noted that the question was "close" re
garding the Supreme Court's conduct in McNeff, but in the end, he
was persuaded that the Supreme Court conclusively interpreted sec
tion 8(f), rather than merely deciding that the NLRB's interpretation
was permissible. ll7 Thus, as a lower federal court, the Ninth Circuit
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be pres
ent at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
Ill. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1132. Only limited section 9(a) status is conferred on
unions which enter prehire agreements under section 8(f). Id. at 1132 n.7.
112. Id. at 1132.
113. Id.
114. Id. In addition, the court noted that the Deklewa rule eliminated the problems
arising under the conversion doctrine. Id. at 1133. Under the conversion doctrine, a sec
tion 8(f) relationship may convert to section 9(a) status. The time of conversion may occur
anytime after the signing of the prehire agreement. Id. Conversion requires a showing of
majority support during a relevant period among an appropriate unit of employees. Id. at
1133-34. Because of the new rule, both parties will know their rights and obligations at all
stages of the bargaining relationship. Id. Both parties will be required to comply with the
agreement, absent a Board-conducted election to reject or change a bargaining representa
.
tive. Id. at 1134.
115. The court also addressed the issue of the "rule" of Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB,
703 F.ld 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1983). Royal held that a panel of the Ninth Circuit could not
adopt a Board decision which conflicted with circuit precedent. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at
1134. The Mesa Verde court circumvented this potential problem by holding that if prior
decisions of the Ninth Circuit constituted only deferential review of NLRB interpretations
of Jabor law, and did not decide that a particular interpretation of a statute was the only
reasonable interpretation, then subsequent panels of the Ninth Circuit are free to adopt new
and reasonable NLRB decisions without the requirement of en banc review. Id. at 1134-35.
116. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136-37.
117. Id. at 1137 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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was bound to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation. 118
Judge Hug's dissent argued that the inquiry was one of pure stat
utory interpretation concerning how Congress intended prehire agree
ments to operate. 119 According to Judge Hug, the Supreme Court
settled this question after examining the statutory language, the legis
lative history, and the NLRB's interpretative rule,120 Consequently,
the Supreme Court's interpretation "must stand until it is overruled by
the Supreme Court or until Congress amends the statute."121 Judge
Hug insisted that the Supreme Court did interpret the statute in both
Higdon and McNeff, even though the Supreme Court gave deference
to the Board's interpretation,122 "The [Supreme] Court did not ...
decide only that the Board's interpretation was a reasonable construc
tion of the Act .... Instead-after giving heightened consideration to
the Board's arguments-the [Supreme] Court passed judgment upon
the meaning of section 8(f) and such judicial interpretation is binding
under our principle of stare decisis."123
In the final dissent, Judge Kozinski interpreted the Mesa Verde
court's majority opinion to mean that if a federal court relies on an
agency interpretation of a statute, then the court's construction is
binding only until the agency adopts a new interpretation. 124 "At that
point the court, or a higher court, or a lower court, may-nay, must
follow the agency's new interpretation unless that interpretation is un
reasonable."12s This deference to an agency's interpretation signifi
cantly shifts power from the jUdiciary to the executive branch. Now,
under the majority's new decision, judges do not decide what the law
is, but only if the agency's interpretation of the law is reasonable. 126
Judge Kozinski continued his dissent with a comparison of the
roles of courts and agencies. He noted that courts and agencies are
both institutionally and functionally different. Judicial decision mak
ing is founded on constitutional safeguards designed to protect it from
the political manipulation which permeates the other two branches of
government. 127 When courts interpret statutes, they are bound to "ap
118. Id.
119. Id. at
120. Id. at
121. Id.
122. Id. at
123. Id. at
124. Id. at
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.

1137-38 (Hug, J., dissenting).
1138.
1138-39.
1138.
1146 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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ply the meaning endowed them by Congress and the President."128
There is but one true meaning behind a statute, and the courts must
find it. 129 Agencies, on the other hand, read policy content into stat
utes, or interpret them to foster a particular political viewpoint. 130
Judge Kozinski continued, "murisprudentially, I am troubled by
the majority's implicit holding that the meaning of a statute can
change in an instant simply because an administrative agency has said
SO."131 "[S]tatutes have no fixed meaning, that in passing laws[,] Con
gress approves a range of . . . interpretations, each as good as the
next."132 This presents a practical problem with the majority's deci
sion: many laws which have been interpreted conclusively by the
court will become uncertain once the agency changes its interpretative
rule. Because of these problems, the stability necessary for case law
will not be found within the agency, but can only be found in the
judiciary. 133

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Stare Decisis
Judge Kozinski's concerns are well-founded. The majority, how
ever, seemed little troubled by the stare decisis concerns raised by the
dissent. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, inferior courts must abide
by or adhere to cases decided by superior courts within the same juris
diction. 134 Assuming that the rule established by Supreme Court pre
cedent was that prehire agreements could be unilaterally
repudiated, l3S the Mesa Verde court did not follow binding precedent.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1146-47.
131. Id. at 1147.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1146-47.
134. See Kelman, The Force ofPrecedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 3,
4 (1967) ("The doctrine can be stated simply: there is an absolute duty to apply the law as
last pronounced by superior judicial authority."); Pound, supra note I, at 6 (Superior court
decisions bind all inferior courts in that jurisdiction.); see supra notes 1-4 and accompany
ing text.
135. Many commentators have discussed various methods that should be considered
when trying to determine exactly what the holding is and the inherent ambiguities involved
with each method. See e.g., Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 359 (1985) (criticizing the view of using material facts, because then one is
forced to determine what the material facts are); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14
A.B.A. J. 71, 72-73 (1928) (holding could be limited to what the court did on the facts);
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987) ("In order to assess what is a prece
dent for what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant similarities between
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Not only did the Mesa Verde court dismiss the stare decisis issue
rather quickly, it did not even discuss stare decisis in the special case
of statutory interpretation. Courts, including the Supreme Court, 136
and commentators agree that there is a strong presumption of correct
ness given to a judicial interpretation of a statute. 137 The Supreme
Court, for instance, recently stated, "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation .... "138
Because this strong presumption is recognized' by courts and
commentators alike, only the most unusual circumstance should jus
tify a departure from it. Traditionally, there are three exceptions
which would warrant a deviation from statutory stare decisis. The
first exception is based upon the possibility that the court's initial con
sideration of the issue was not thorough. 139 The second exception fo
cuses on the idea that the statute is very general; thus, Congress must
have left development of the statutory scheme to the COurtS. I40 The
last exception proposes that when precedent has not generated exten
sive public and private reliance, it would not be harmful to deviate
from the precedent. 141 The question therefore becomes, can Mesa
the two events. In turn, we must extract this determination from some other organizing
standard specifying which similarities are important and which we can safely ignore.").
136. For a recent Supreme Court decision discussing statutory stare decisis, see Pat
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989).
137. Courts and commentators suggest four reasons for the doctrine. First, some
suggest that a longstanding statutory interpretation becomes a part of the law and as such
only Congress can change it. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. A second
reason is based upon legislative acquiescence. That is, if Congress does not overrule the
precedent, and especially if it reenacts the statute without changing the language at issue,
then courts presume that Congress approves of the judicial interpretation. See supra notes
34-37 and accompanying text. The third reason is based upon the presumption that parties
have relied upon the decision and have conducted their affairs accordingly. See supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text. The final rationale rests upon a separation of powers argu
ment. Congress is given the task of creating and amending the law, while the judiciary is
confined to interpreting it. If the judiciary changes a rule which has been "amended" to the
statute, then it is exercising a legislative function-for only Congress can amend or repeal a
statute. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370 (emphasis added). The exact degree of deference
to be given to statutory precedents is a subject of some debate. One commentator advo
cates an absolute rule-that only Congress may change a judicial statutory interpretation.
Marshall, supra note 7, at 183. Another commentator, however, has suggested abandoning
the super-strong presumption of correctness in favor of an "evolutive" approach. Eskridge,
supra note 4, at 1363.
139. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1369-84; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
220-21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (suggesting a
significant exception to the strong presumption of correctness when the statutory precedent
is procedurally flawed due to, for example, poor briefing or inadequate deliberation).
140. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1369-84.

141. Id.
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Verde be explained by one of these exceptions?
1.

Thoroughness of the Supreme Court's Investigation of
Congressional Intent in Precedent

First, the two precedents, NLRB v. Local Union No. 103 ("Hig
don")142 and Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,143 must be examined to deter
mine how thoroughly the Supreme Court investigated the issue of
Congress' intent to allow unilateral repudiation of prehire agreements.
In Higdon, the Court stated that "[t]he Board and the Court of Ap
peals ... differ principally on the legal questions of how § 8(f) is to be
construed and of what consequences the execution of a prehire agree
ment has on the enforcement of other sections of the Act ...." 144 The
Supreme Court concluded that the "Board's construction of the Act,
although perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of
the statutory language and a reasonable implementation of the pur
poses of the relevant statutory sections."14s
The Board's view was that picketing to enforce a prehire agree
ment had the impermissible effect of requiring recognition of the labor
union as the employees' bargaining representative, when in fact the
union did not represent a majority of the employees. l46 The Court
commented that "[t]he Board's position is rooted in the generally pre
vailing statutory policy that a union should not purport to act as the
collective-bargaining agent for all unit employees, and may not be rec
ognized as such, unless it is the voice of the majority of the employees
in the unit."147 The Court acknowledged that in the past, it had held
that "both [the] union and [the] employer commit unfair practices
when they sign a collective-bargaining agreement recognizing the
union as the exclusive bargaining representative when in fact only a
minority of the employees have authorized the union to represent their
interests."148 However, the Court explained, "[s]ection 8(f) is an ex
ception to this rule."149 When the employer is in the construction in
dustry, section 8(f) legitimizes the execution of a prehire agreement
with a minority union, an act which is normally an unfair practice by
both employer and union.1 so
142. 434 U.S. 335 (1978); see supra note 80.
143. 461 U.S. 260 (1983); see supra note 81.
144. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 341-44.
147. Id. at 344.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 345.
150. Id.
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The Higdon Court next examined the legislative history of section
8(f). The Court determined that the motivating factor behind section
8(f) was an awareness of the unique situation in the construction in
dustry.lsi Congress determined that two particular reasons justified
the use of prehire agreements with unions that did not represent a
majority of the employees. ls2 The first reason was that it was "neces
sary for the employer to know his labor costs before making the esti
mate upon which his bid [would] be based."ls3 The second reason was
that "the employer must be able to have available a supply of skilled
craftsmen ready for quick referral."IS4
Next, the Court noted:
The Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case
represents a defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to
considerable deference. Courts may prefer a different application of
the relevant sections, but "[t]he function of striking that balance to
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate re
sponsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the Na
tional Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."
Of course, "recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administra
tive power . . . obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the
Board's actions." But we cannot say that the Board has here
"[moved] into a new area of regulation which Congress [has] not
committed to it."ISS
The union then tried to persuade the Court that the Board's stat
utory interpretation deserved little or no deference because the Board
had been inconsistent in its application. ls6 The Court quickly dis
missed the argument by simply distinguishing the cases relied upon by
the union. IS7 Nevertheless, even if the union were correct and the
151. Id. at 348.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2442, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 759, 777
(1959».
154. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2442, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 759, 777
(1959».
155. Id. at 350 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87,
96 (1957); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960».
156. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350.
157. Id. at 350-51. The Union suggested that R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B.
693 (1971), was inconsistent with Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963).
The Court noted that the Oilfield Maintenance decision did not make it clear whether the
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Board had been inconsistent in its application, that may not have mat
tered to the Court. The Court stated: "[a]n administrative agency is
not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts
still sit in review of the administrative decision and should not ap
proach the statutory construction issue de novo and without regard to
the administrative understanding of the statutes."158
Next, the union argued that "the Board's position permitting an
employer to repudiate a prehire agreement until the union attains ma
jority support renders the contract for all practical purposes unen
forceable . . . ."159 Similarly, the Court quickly dismissed this
argument by distinguishing the case relied upon by the union to sup
port the enforceability of prehire agreements. 1OO It did not even ad
dress the fact that these agreements may actually be rendered
unenforceable due to unilateral repudiation.
Justice Stewart wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined in
his dissent by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. The dissent did not
think that any section of the Act "rendered illegal the union's peaceful
primary picket protesting Higdon's unilateral and total breach of its
prehire agreement ...."161 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent
argued:
When an employer in the construction industry does choose to enter
a § 8(f) prehire agreement, there is nothing in the provisions or pol
icies of national labor law that allows the employer, or the Board, to
dismiss the agreement as a nullity. Yet in this case the Court holds
that both the Board and the employer may do precisely that. 162
union involved in that case had ever attained majority status. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350-51.
In addition, the Court noted that the Oilfield Maintenance case was distinguished by the
Board in Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 n.5, "as being 'primarily con
cerned' with 'the right of a successor-employer to disavow contracts made by a predecessor
with five different unions and [its ability to] substitute the terms of a contract it had with
another union.''' Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351 (quoting Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 701 n.5).
158. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351.
159. Id.
160. Id. The Union argued that the Board's position was contrary to the Supreme
Court~s decision in Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351. The Higdon Court described the Retail Clerks opinion as recog
nizing that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act conferred jurisdiction on
federal courts to consider suits on contracts between an employer and a minority union, as
well as those with majority-designated collective-bargaining agents. Id. at 351. This cate
gory also included section 8(f) contracts. Therefore, the Higdon Court limited Retail
Clerks to a decision on a jurisdictional issue. Simply because a court has jurisdiction to
entertain a suit on a particular contract does not render the contract enforceable. Id. at
351-52.
161. Id. at 355 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 353.
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The next case in which the Court had an opportunity to examine·
the issue of the legislative intent behind prehire agreements was Jim
McNeff, Inc. v. Todd. 163 After discussing and analyzing the reasons
behind Congress' enactment of the statute, the Court reassessed its
Higdon opinion. l64 The Court stated:
We first addressed the enforceability of a § 8(f) prehire agree
ment in Higdon. . .. In Higdon, we affirmed the Board's view that a
prehire agreement does not make a union the "representative of [an
employer's] employees" ....
In upholding the Board's view that a union commits an unfair
labor practice by picketing to enforce a prehire agreement before it
has attained majority status, we noted in Higdon that this view pro
tects [the] interests that Congress intended to uphold when it en
acted § 8(f)....
. . . [O]ur decision in Higdon promotes Congress' "intention
... that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily ...."
In accord with this intention, we approved the Board's conclusion
that a "prehire agreement is voidable" "until and unless [the union]
attains majority support in the relevant unit...."
The concerns with the § 7 rights of employees to select their
own bargaining representative and our fidelity to Congress' intent
that prehire agreements be voluntary-and voidable-that led to
our decision in Higdon are not present in [McNeff) . ... 16S

The McNeff Court also spoke of a party's "undoubted right to
repudiate a prehire agreement."l66 Thus, from this reading of the
McNeff opinion, one is led to believe that the Court considers itself to
have done an independent analysis of the issue in Higdon and agreed
with the Board only as an afterthought. 167 It seems as though the
163. 461 U.S. 260 (1983); see supra note 81.
164. McNeff, 461 U.S. at 265-67.
165. Id. at 266-69 (citations omitted). McNeff differed from Higdon because McNeff
involved the monetary obligations incurred by an employer after he signed a section 8(f)
contract, while Higdon involved picketing to enforce the contract. These monetary obliga
tions do not "impair the right of the employees to select their own bargaining agent. Un
like the situation in Higdon, enforcement of accrued obligations in a § 301 suit does not
mean that the union represents a majority of the employer's employees." McNeff, 461 U.S.
at 269.
166. Id. at 270.
167. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting) ("I am persuaded that the
Supreme Court conclusively and authoritatively interpreted section 8(f), rather than
merely deciding that the NLRB's interpretation was permissible."), cert. denied, III S. Ct.
209 (1990); id. at 1138 (Hug, J., dissenting) ("I part company from the majority because I
believe the Supreme Court did definitively construe section 8(f) in both Higdon and
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Court has not only thoroughly researched and analyzed the issue once,
but rather, twice. 168
In light of this analysis of the Higdon and McNeff decisions, any
reliance upon an exception to a rule of statutory stare decisis rooted in
the inadequacy of precedent seems unsustainable. The Mesa Verde
court's decision cannot be justified on the ground that the Supreme
Court failed to thoroughly consider the issue of the voidability of a
prehire agreement. Consequently, the next exception to statutory
stare decisis must be reviewed to determine whether the Mesa Verde
decision falls within its purview. Therefore, an examination of the de
gree to which Congress left the development of the statute to the
courts is required.
2.

Degree to Which Congress Left Developmeni of the
Statutory Scheme to the Judiciary

Some justices have argued that the statutory presumption of cor
rectness should be relaxed when dealing with broad congressional stat
utes, akin to general statements of policy, where Congress has left to
the courts the job of filling in the details of the statute. 169 This gradual
statutory development would occur in a common law style. Justice
Stevens once wrote that "when the Court unequivocally rejects one
reading of a statute, its action should be respected in future litiga
tion."I7O Justice Stevens later qualified this statement: "[l]ike most,
this proposition of law is not wholly without exceptions. Congress
phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms, expecting the
federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by
case basis in the common-law tradition."171
The rationale for this exception is straightforward. When Con
gress has declared a broad, sweeping policy, the courts are assigned
McNeff, although the Court may have given deference to the Board's interpretation in do
ing so.").
168. In general, when a case involves an administrative agency, a court may articu
late its opinion as deference to the agency, when in fact it just simply agrees with the
agency. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 61. The court may also state that the interpre
tative rule is controlling, that it has great weight, or that it must be given effect unless it is
unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute. Id. at 60-61. Should the court disagree with
the agency, it will simply dismiss the interpretative rule by declaring that it is entitled to no
weight. Id. Consequently, the judicial verbiage in deciding the proper weight to afford an
interpretative rule "is not necessarily to be taken literally." Id. at 61. This is because the
verbalisms are "usually overstated" in the direction with which the court agrees. Id. at 64.
169. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1377-81.
170. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,641 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
171. Id. at 641 n.12.
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the task of shaping the boundaries of that policy on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, when the courts conduct this common law process, they
overrule prior decisions which are inconsistent with the general con
gressional policy, or they overrule unworkable rules. I72 This overrul
ing is done in the same manner as the overruling of any common law
precedent.
When this exception is applied to Mesa Verde, the question be
comes what is the extent that Congress has left the job of developing
the NLRA to the courts. While the text of the NLRA and its legisla
tive history are both extensive,!73 not every possible situation was pro
vided for under the Act.1 74 Consequently, some aspects of the statute
were left to the courts to interpret, with the aid of the agency's inter
pretative rules.17S Since Congress did leave some decisions to the
courts, a judicial precedent should be overruled only when the prece
dent is inconsistent with congressional intent or provides an unwork
able rule.
The Higdon Court thoroughly analyzed the congressional intent
and held that prehire agreements are susceptible to unilateral repudia
tion. 176 In addition, in McNeff, the Court had a further opportunity to
examine the issue of the voidability of prehire agreements. In that
case, the McNeff Court went to great lengths to prove that the legisla
tive intent called for the voidability of prehire agreements. 177 In ana
lyzing the legislative history, the Court looked to the statute, prior
case law, House reports and Senate reports.l7 8 Nowhere in its McNeff
opinion did the Court even suggest that the Higdon Court might have
inaccurately read the NLRA's legislative history as it applied to
prehire agreements.
Since the legislative history was accurately applied, Higdon
should be overruled only if the rule it adopts is unworkable. Obvi
ously, if the rule were unworkable, its deficiencies would have become
apparent during the five years between the Higdon and McNeff deci
sions. In fact, in Higdon, the union argued that the Court's rule was
unworkable because the voidability· of section 8(f) agreements made
172. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1377-81.
173. For language of selected sections of the Act, see supra notes 42, 44, 74 & 80.
174. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 129 (1944); see supra notes
45-51 and accompanying text.
175. For more information on the relationship between the courts and agencies, see
supra notes 9-20, 41-61 and accompanying text.
176. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 346-49 (1978).
177. Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 265-71 (1983).
178. Id.
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them virtually unenforceable. 179 The Court, however, seemed uncon
cerned with, or at least unpersuaded by, this argument and quickly
disposed of the issue. ISO
Thus, McNeff again thoroughly analyzed the reasoning behind
Higdon and did not find that the legislative history was applied incor
rectly or that the rule was unworkable. Recent conclusions by the
Ninth Circuit that the legislative history was applied incorrectly and
that the rule is unworkable, coming after the Board's change of posi
tion, seem more rooted in a need to justify a dramatic departure from
Supreme Court precedent than in an unbiased appraisal of the
voidability of prehire agreements. Hence, the second exception to the
strong presumption of correctness does not apply to the situation in
Mesa Verde.
3.

Extent of Public and Private Reliance

The third exception to the rule of statutory stare decisis occurs
when there has been little reliance on the Court's interpretation. lSI
Courts presume that Congress relies on the judicial decision unless
Congress amends or repeals the statute. lS2
Not only is Congress presumed to have relied upon the judicial
decision, but private parties are also presumed to have relied upon
it. ls3 After the Supreme Court ruled twice that prehire agreements
were voidable unless and until the union attained majority support,
both labor and management presumably relied upon this fact. 184 Most
179. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351. The union argued that the Board's position allowing
an employer to unilaterally repudiate a prehire agreement until the Union attained majority
status rendered the contract unenforceable, which was contrary to the Court's prior deci
sion in Retail Clerks Int'I Ass'n v. Lions Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). The Court
did not address the workability of prehire agreements because it limited the Retail Clerks
decision to one of jurisdiction. Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351-52; see supra note 159.
181. Examples of the Court's willingness to overrule a statutory precedent due to
slight private reliance and subsequent contrary legislation include: Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279-88 (1988); Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1984); Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,
497-98 (1973).
182. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382 ("Where Congress itself has relied on a prece
dent, the precedent may be entitled to a super-strong presumption of correctness. "); see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
183. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1382 ("Where private parties have over time shaped
their relations around a precedent's rule, it is considered presumptively unfair to change
the precedent ... , and courts will not do so without strong reason. "); see supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
184. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local Union 953 v. Mar-len of La., Inc.,
180.
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employers and unions know their rights in this legal arena.
Prehire agreements were authorized by Congress because of the
unique needs of the construction industry.t 8s The fact that the use of
prehire agreements was codified suggests that their use is widespread.
If this is true, then it would be logical that parties who knew they
could legally enter an agreement would also know of their equally im
portant ability to legally repudiate them, at least until the union at
tained majority status.
Thus far, there is no compelling reason to warrant a 'deviation
from the strong presumption of correctness afforded statutory prece
dents. None of the traditional exceptions to statutory stare decisis are
applicable. The only other justification for the Mesa Verde decision
would be if the need to defer to the NLRB outweighed the considera
tions of precedent. There are several different circumstances under
which Mesa Verde's deference to the NLRB would be warranted.
These circumstances are discussed below.

B. Agency Deference
There are several different circumstances under which courts will
defer to an agency, thus implementing the agency's interpretative rule.
Courts may give the interpretative rule authoritative effect if the rule
were outstanding when the statute was reenacted l86 or if the rule were
made contemporaneously with the statute. 187 Likewise, courts look to
such factors as when the interpretative rule was actually created and
the consistency of the agency's position.1 88
When applying these factors to this case, one can see that the
906 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1990) (The contractor "entered into its pre-hire agreements
with the unions relying on its then-existing right to repudiate unilaterally the agreements so
long as the unions had not achieved majority status.").
185. See supra note 73.
186. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 7:13, at 59.
187. Id.; see Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978)
(contemporaneous construction of a statute warrants "considerable weight"); Adamo
Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contempOraneous construction of a
statute receives "peculiar weight" (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 315 (1933»); Center For Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (An administrative interpretation that is made contemporaneously with the statute
receives high deference because it "presumably ... is unlikely to have been either informed
or coerced by the enacting legislature's genuine intent.").
188. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 167 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("Both consistency and contemporaneous construction increase the amount of deference to
be given to an agency's interpretation."); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S.
443,450 (1978) ("This longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is entitled
to considerable weight."); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976)
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creation of the Board's new interpretative rule occurred fairly recently
and not at the time of the enactment of the statute. The rule was
actually announced in 1987 by the Deklewa 189 court. Not only is the
interpretive rule of recent origin, but it is absolutely contradictory to
the previous NLRB interpretation of the statute.
Although agencies are not disqualified from changing their inter
pretation, more weight is given to an agency's interpretative rule when
that rule has remained constant over the years. l90 Here, the NLRB
did not maintain a consistent interpretative rule. Yet, even after ac
knowledging these changes in the interpretative rule, the Mesa Verde
court still deferred to the agency.
Granting this much deference to the Board implies that there is a
dynamic congressional intent or even no congressional intent. 191 Im
plementing all the Board's interpretative rules simply because they are
a reasonable interpretation of the statute implies that there is not just
one true legislative intent, but rather a range of legislative intents
which the Board is free to rely on at its discretion. One of the func
tions of the NLRB is to effectuate national labor policy; however, it is
for Congress and not the Board to define and determine this policy. 192
"[W]here Congress has adopted a selective system for dealing with
[labor] evils, the [Labor Relations] Board is confined to that system.
("We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted
with earlier pronouncements of the agency.").
In addition to the consistency of the agency's position, courts also look to the extent of
the agency's expertise. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (citing General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976»; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231-37
(1974); Skidmore v. Swift &. Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (timing, consistency and exper
tise are all factors to be considered when determining the deference to give an administra
tive interpretation); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &. Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25 (1977)
(The Court noted the need for deference in light of "the complexity and technical nature of
the statutes and the subjects they regulate ... and [the] EPA's unique experience and
expertise ...." (quoting American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 450 n.16 (7th Cir.
1975»); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Where the issue [of statutory construction] presented involves questions of scien
tific expertise . . . we defer to the Administrator's interpretation."). This factor is less
important in this case because expertise alone, without some additional justification, would
not justify deference.
.
189. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &. Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3
v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir,), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) ("Deklewa").
190. See supra note 188.
191. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1147 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cerro denied, 111 S. Ct. 209
(1990).
192. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965) ("[W]e think that the Board construes its functions too
expansively when it claims general authority to define national labor policy by balancing
the competing interests of labor and management.").
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[T]he Board cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive
regulatory scheme."193 The Board cannot adopt a policy which will
frustrate or defeat the congressional policy; 194 nor can it ignore other
equally important congressional objectives. 195 Because the court must
read a statute in the way that best reflects its meaning, courts are far
slower than agencies to overrule their own previous decisions. 196 "By
contrast, agencies can change their outlook as often and easily as a
chameleon changes its color. A change of administration may prompt
an executive department to alter its position on a particular piece of
legislation overnight."197 In addition, "appointment of a single com
missioner may drastically change the agency's approach to its organic
statute."198
Courts should be slow to overturn Board decisions, but they are
not left to wholly accept them.l 99 Courts are not obligated to stand
aside and rubber-stamp Board decisions that are inconsistent with a
statutory mandate or which defeat or frustrate the congressional statu
tory policy. 200 Courts would not be fulfilling judicial obligations if
they did not fully review Board decisions. 201
Thus, the Mesa Verde court is bound to do more than make a
cursory determination of the reasonableness of the Board's interpreta
tive rule. It should follow judicial precedent in appropriate situations.
It should take into account the factors of timing, consistency, and ad
herence to the congressional policy underlying section 8(f) of the
NLRA.
CONCLUSION

The Mesa Verde court set aside Supreme Court precedent too
swiftly. The court virtually ignored stare decisis, and did not address
the strong presumption of correctness typically granted to statutory
193. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 u.s. 667, 676 (1961) (citation
omitted).
194. NLRB v. Appleton Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1961).
195. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,47 (1942).
196. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 209
(1990).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. NLRB V. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. V. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803
(1945).
200. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1146 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
201. Id.

1991]

STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

223

precedent. Because the strong presumption of correctness applies, it
should be deviated from only in the most unusual of circumstances.
After analyzing the exceptions which would warrant a departure from
this presumption, the situation in Mesa Verde does not rise to the level
of a justifiable deviation. Since there is no reason to depart from statu
tory precedent, the Supreme Court precedents in Higdon and McNeff
should have been respected.
In addition to the lack of justification for a departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis, there was no compelling reason to deviate
from the Supreme Court precedents under the agency deference doc
trine. The Mesa Verde court did not take into account several factors
usually associated with the judicial review of agency interpretations,
for example, timing and consistency. The Mesa Verde rule simply
forces the judiciary to defer to the agency so long as the agency's inter
pretation of the statute is reasonable. Because there is no justifiable
departure from Supreme Court precedent under either stare decisis or
agency deference, the Mesa Verde court should have followed the
McNeff and Higdon decisions.

Martha Allard

